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Economic studies have shown that there are two types of regulation schemes which can be considered as a vi-
tal part of today’s global economy: self-regulation enforced by self-regulation organizations to govern industry
practices, and government regulation which is considered as another scheme to sustain corporate adherence. An
outstanding problem of particular interest is to understand quantitatively the role of these regulation schemes
in evolutionary dynamics. Typically, punishment usually occurs for enforcement of regulations. Taking into
account both types of punishments to curve the regulations, we develop a game model where six evolutionary
situations with corresponding combinations of strategies are considered. Furthermore, a semi-analytical method
is developed to allow us to give an accurate estimations of the boundaries between the phases of full defection
and nondefection. We find that, associated with the evolutionary dynamics, for infinite well-mixed population,
the mix of both punishments performs better than one punishment alone in promoting public cooperation, but
for networked population the cooperator-driven punishment turns out to be a better choice. We also uncover
monotonous facilitating effects of synergy effect, punishment fine and feedback sensitivity on the public coop-
eration for infinite well-mixed population. Conversely, for networked population an optimal intermediate range
of feedback sensitivity is needed to best promote punishers’ populations. Overall, networked structure is over-
all more favorable for punishers and further for public cooperation, because of both network reciprocity and
mutualism between punishers and cooperators who do not punish defectors. We provide physical understand-
ings of the observed phenomena, through a detailed statistical analysis of frequencies of different strategies and
spatial pattern formations in different evolution situations. These results provide valuable insights into how to
select and enforce suitable regulation measures to let public cooperation keep prevalent, which has potential
implications not only to self-regulation, but also to other topics in economics and social science.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the field of evolutionary game theory, the conventional
social dilemma i. e. the first-order social dilemma means that
the well-being of the population depend only on the level of
cooperation while defection is the best choice for one indi-
vidual. Besides the mechanisms to sustain or promote co-
operative behaviors such as kin selection [1], reputation [2],
group selection, reciprocity [3, 4], punishment has also been
widely approved as an available rule to alleviate this public
good problem [5, 6]. Large number of related studies have
been proceeded to center on how punishment rules govern the
evolution of the game systems [5, 7–9]. At the same time,
these studies have affirmed that punishment is a useful tool to
repel defection behaviors and to facilitate cooperation of the
population, through both empirical experiments and theoreti-
cal analysis. However, second-order free-riding (i.e., second-
order dilemma) arising from the fact that punishers have to
bear extra substantial punishment cost is a non-ignorable im-
pediment to the evolutionary stability of punishment. Since
this would weaken punishers’ persistent monitoring ability
and sanctions on wrong-doers [10–12]. Aiming to address
this issue, some researchers have tried to seek more effective
specific strategies or mechanisms [13–18].
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An issue of growing interest in current research of game
theory is that humans prefer pool punishment over peer pun-
ishment for maintaining the commons [19]. Unlike peer pun-
ishment in which the punishment act is carried out by peers,
measures of pool punishment are usually outsourced and car-
ried out by a paid organization which collects punishment
costs (i.e., taxes) from the cooperators who are willing to elim-
inate the defectors from the population [11, 20]. It is con-
vinced that these cooperators can be regarded as punishers to
some extent, who can commonly share the cost of pool pun-
ishment. Within this game framework, in some cases consid-
eration of punishment strategies can solve the ’second-order
free-rider problem’ in the presence of a segregation of behav-
ioral strategies [21], or if punishment fine is large enough [22].
Also, it has been found that prosocial punishers can outper-
form combination of positive and negative reciprocity, which
while is able to invade defectors [23]. Especially, recent stud-
ies highlight ’adaptive punishment’ is good at facilitating pub-
lic cooperation or even double-edged, where the punishers
condition their sanctioning activities against antisocial behav-
iors on one threshold relating to the success or abundance of
cooperators/defectors within the groups [24–26]. In reality
pool punishment is widely exploited by many authorities to
mitigate the free riders’ destructive potential; regardless of
the punishment being direct, indirect, first order or second or-
der [11, 27–29]. The cost of pool punishment is commonly
shared, which thus could reduce both financial burdens and
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2the risk of being revenged as much as possible [30]. Imple-
ment institutions of the pool punishment are also easily to be
established to ensure the fairness so that defectors are timely
identified and punished. As operation institutions of pool pun-
ishment, third organizations such as modern courts, the police
system and regulation organizations are developed to carry out
punitive measures, so as to alleviate the problems of ”second-
order free-riders”, antisocial punishment [9, 31] and retalia-
tion [30]. Therefore, pool punishment has widely gained more
attentions than before as an important symbol of modern civ-
ilized society.
Moreover, as an important background to motivate our
present study, there are one realistic case which must be stated
with respect to punishment measures whose executions are
strongly dependent on the abundance of free-riding behaviors
in the systems.
In commerce self-regulation is an important mechanism
for governing industry practices, owning many benefits over
government regulation for consumers, businesses, the gov-
ernment, and the economy as a whole [32]. The incentive
for the private sector to undertake self-regulatory actions i.e.,
to develop and comply with standards is that they are in-
centivized by customer expectations and threatened by possi-
ble government regulation, critical public opinion, which ac-
tually issues statements of concern for public welfare [33].
Further, self regulation is the process whereby an organiza-
tion or company is enforced by self-regulation organization
(SRO) to monitor its own adherence to legal, ethical or safety
standards, rather than a third-party and independent agency
such as a governmental entity monitor to enforce those stan-
dards [34]. Self-regulation is a win-win for both businesses,
consumers and government. Businesses benefit from not only
regulations that are predictable and reasonable, as opposed to
command and control rules that are often burdensome and ex-
pensive to comply with; but also more efficient enforcement
approaches which allow them to better manage their scarce
resources [33, 35] and to increase competitiveness by im-
proving the quality of products and services as a first-mover
advantage [36]. At the same time, customer expectations
are satisfied because self-regulation organizations (SROs) en-
force rules and standards set by themselves to protect con-
sumers, which additionally upholds rights for employees and
improve public trust [32, 37]. Self-implemented standards can
also span jurisdictions [38]. Studies have shown that self-
policing across locations makes industry-developed standards
more predictable and consistent, and therefore less costly than
government regulations [32, 39].
On the other hand, costs of self-regulation activities which
are imposed on firms cause them to shift resources away from
other activities to achieve compliance. These costs are of-
ten justified as a means of improving social welfare, however,
also bad factor giving rise to free-rider problem which would
cause incredible harm to people, government and finally busi-
ness [40]. In detail, in order to be effective, a SRO may set
rules for an industry including firms that do not participate in
the SRO. These outside firms enjoy the benefits of the reg-
ulatory regime without paying any of the costs, as well as
those ’bad actors’ who also stay outside the system so that
they can avoid the rules of the SRO. Such a system is actually
unfair to dues-paying businesses, which makes self regulation
an inadequate choice for certain industries. This limitation of
SROs cannot be ignored. Additionally, self-regulation inef-
fectively enforces its rules as a punishment tool for governing
the private sector, when the problem that massive firms run
roughshod over rights seems to be widespread, from India’s
mining sector [41], to Cambodia’s garment industry [42], to
the debt buying industry in the United States [43, 44]. In such
cases high proportion of entities are found to be unlawful, the
threat or even powerful measures of government regulation
can lead to a more effective and stronger enforcement by the
SRO, or public-expected results through government direct in-
volvements. This suggests that government oversight or en-
forcement is indispensable or even final guarantee for public
welfare, regardless of the fact by its nature it creates barriers
to innovation or competitive entry because of its established
norms that only capture current market participants and activ-
ities.
Meaningful regulation schemes are usually driven by a
complex mix of internal, external, and reputational motiva-
tions [45]. Especially, the nature of intrinsic organizational
motivation is central to the definition of the both regulation
schemes [32, 45]. The above statement of the two regula-
tion schemes initially shows that the amount or proportions of
disciplined members or bad actors/wrongdoings in the SROs
can be considered as crucial intrinsic motivations to drive
meaningful implementations of the two regulations. This is
also supported by previous empirical studies involving self-
regulation [40, 43, 44, 46] that the abundance of disciplined
members or bad actors in the SROs is an essence to curve
action modes of the two regulation measures. Note that, not
only punitive sanctions but also other tools such as regula-
tory threats and surveillance can be effective means of reg-
ulation enforcement, while measures of the two regulations
are amused to be punitive actions in our study for the sake of
exploration. This assumption is rational, since punitive en-
forcement or at least the possibility of it, turns out to be es-
sential to the ultimate success of schemes that incorporate ei-
ther self-regulation or government regulation [32]. Therefore,
for simplicity, in present paper we can correspondingly de-
fine self-regulation and government regulation as cooperator-
driven (CP) and defector-driven punishment (DP), within the
framework of game theory, by virtue of the important one of
their intrinsic motivations: the abundance of bad actors or dis-
ciplined members in the SROs. More in detail, implementa-
tion of CP and DP are significantly driven by the abundance
or proportion of disciplined and undisciplined members in the
SROs (we will give concrete form on how the intrinsic mo-
tivations quantitatively govern the implementation probabil-
ity of the punishments in Sec. II) respectively, which is also
the definition of the two punishment measures. Meanwhile,
it must be stressed that enforcement tools of the two regu-
lations especially self-regulation are diverse in reality. One
example of self-regulation is Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority (FINRA), which is subject to United States Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission (SEC) oversight, and which
imposes penalties on bad brokers [47]. Besides, the other en-
3forcement actions of self-regulation like being excluded from
the association and/or making public the accusations are non-
negligible [48]. In accordance with the proposed definitions
of the two different regulations, the regulation issue discussed
above can also be well mapped to a pool punishment in which
the two different punitive measures ought to be captured.
In reality, SROs operate essentially to protect the interests
of individual firms or the industry as a whole, while govern-
ments are more concerned for protecting social welfare be-
cause they face the pressures from the public all the time [49].
That is to say, unlike government regulation, industry-created
standards run the risk of advancing commercial interest over
public interest. For the SROs, the only way is to move faster
(i. e. make higher quality standards or stricter regulations than
do governments) than the government so that they can timely
avoid greater benefit losses caused by government regulation
or public criticism [50]. That is why SROs are more will-
ing to nip the irregularities in the bud (or there are few illegal
firms to be identified in SROs). However, when high pro-
portion of business actors of one association grow too com-
fortable accepting and helping to entrench because of a par-
ticular kind of lawlessness [41, 43, 44], considerable cost of
regulations may make the interests of a particular industry
and society do not align, the SROs or industry associations
will not collaborate to make punishment available, but rather
collude to protect vested interests instead of public interests
in absence of any external pressure from government stake-
holders [51]. Such activities can thus reduce social welfare.
Many of these concerns are finally allayed by independent
non-profit public-interest organizations such as government
oversights and audits which could strongly monitor and en-
force rules [51]. This is the essential mechanism for why
cooperator-driven punishers (defector-driven punishers) make
a decision to exert punishment more when the proportion of
cooperators (defectors) is higher in SROs. Relating to our
model, this reality suggests that our theoretical hypothesis of
the function modes of the two different pool punishment mea-
sures are rational and realistic to some extent. It is thus more
convinced that government organizations can be theoretically
represented by defector-driven punishers while SROs can be
perfectly mapped to cooperator-driven punishers.
An global apocalypse – the 2007-2009 financial crisis [68],
may provides some key hints on how the two punishment
measures intervened along with an increase in bad debts
brought about by more bad actors, and what performances
they had. Fig. 1 provides further empirical evidences by illus-
trating five key statistical characterizing quantities (please see
the caption of Fig. 1 for more details of these quantities): the
number of disciplinary actions against firms and their employ-
ees which are brought by FINRA, the number of fines which
represent sanctions exerted by FINRA for rule violations, the
total amount of fines levied from individual brokers and firms,
the number of member firms (i.e. FINRA-registered firms),
the regulatory activeness of U.S. Government/The Federal Re-
serve. At the early stages before 2008, SROs such as National
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD), New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE) or even their combination FINRA
can still regulate their members through execution of their en-
forcement programs such as great sanctions (i. e. financial
penalties) [54, 69]. Correspondingly, it can be observed in
Fig. 1 that self-regulation activities remain flat or even high
level outside the filled areas (Fig. 1(a)-(c)), along with a de-
crease in government deregulation in finance (see Fig. 1(e)).
However, with persisting push from the loan market, more and
more financial companies reached a tacit understanding so as
to protect and get vested interests through ’creating’ various
financial innovations which greatly change the leverage. In
such case, many of the companies rabidly opposed any move
to make those standards mandatory or to enforce relevant le-
gal standards more vigorously. As a result, self-regulation
presented less efficiencies; further leading to approach of the
crisis which finally happened along with the bankruptcy of
Lehman Brothers and acquisition of Merrill Lynch [70]. At
this moment, the public became rather angry, which made
the government begin to police the financial market by means
of highly punitive measures against some undisciplined firms,
with the assistant of FINRA [54, 68]. Fig. 1(a)-(c) thus show
that a valley in self-regulation interventions from FINRA oc-
curred within the the duration of 2007-2009 financial crisis
indicted by the filled areas in which, however denser diamond
markers observed in Fig. 1(e) mean that more frequent in-
volvements of US Government/The FED are released. The
regulatory measures by government may be various and not
limited to punishments like more stringent acts (like Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act) and
judicial investigations most of which are actually stimulated
by this crisis. Whatever, more frequent involvements of these
measures definitely reveal greater willingness of government
to regulate the financial firms and their representatives at the
heart of the crisis (see Fig. 1(e)). Moreover, we can observe
that considerable government policies are still released after-
wards the crisis because policy making is rather time con-
suming and thus always time-delayed. Taken together, this
disastrous process clearly shows a drawing: implementations
of self-regulation or cooperator-driven punishment are pro-
moted by abundant disciplined members who are willing to
share the risk and costs of execution, while government (i. e.
defector-driven punisher) is more willing to make a strong in-
tervention through defector-driven punishments when the in-
dustry is widely eroded by a large amount of bad actors. In
any case, the number of FINRA-registered firms gradually de-
creases with time, which further proves the above conclusion.
This classical example further supports the statement that the
amount of undisciplined (or disciplined) is the key factor to
mainly dominate intervention level of the two different pun-
ishments.
It is believed that this important function mode of pool pun-
ishment can be found in many other realistic social systems.
The key fact that motivated our present work is that, with re-
spect to prosocial pool punishment, the two punishment mea-
sures against free-riding may have definitely different perfor-
mances due to different evolution situations corresponding to
different combinations of strategies and different population
structures. For a model of evolution dynamics to capture the
real behaviors as accurately as possible, the distinct proba-
bility to curve establishment/enforcement degree of the two
4FIG. 1. Empirical evidences for the regulatory activities by either FINRA [52–65] or U.S. Government/The Federal Reserve (The FED) [66],
which are consistent with the rules made by our model. More in detail, five key statistical characterizing quantities are shown: (a) Na denotes
the number of disciplinary actions against firms and their employees, which are brought by FINRA —the self-regulatory organization (SRO) for
brokerage firms doing business with the public in the United States. The disciplinary actions may result in sanctions including censures, fines,
suspensions and, in egregious cases, expulsions or bars from the industry [62]. (b) Nf denotes the number of fines which represent sanctions
exerted by FINRA for rule violations. It should be noted that the number of Finra fines for 2017 and 2018 is still either being counted or even
unavailable. (c) Tf is the total amount of fines levied by FINRA from individual brokers and firms. (d) The size of the whole population of
registered members (i.e. FINRA-registered firms instead of disciplined members or cooperators) which gradually decreases with time. (e) The
regulatory activeness of U.S. Government/The Federal Reserve, in which each diamond represents a press release about regulatory policy or
act made by public institutions in U.S. Government/The Federal Reserve. Obviously, the time windows during which denser diamond markers
can be observed reveal more frequent involvement of government regulations. In all subfigures, the filled areas represent the duration of 2007-
2009 financial crisis (December 2007-June 2009) [67]. Up to now, we cannot know the accurate frequency or number of cooperators (i.e.,
disciplined members) or defectors (i.e., undisciplined members) during this financial crisis because not all bad actions cannot be successfully
identified and the cost of investigations themselves are huge. However, it must be stressed that the frequency of disciplinary actions against
firms which are brought by government or FINRA are positively related to the quantity of undisciplined actions in the course of financial crisis
or at other times, respectively. Furthermore, more undisciplined members were ’identified’ as forms of bankruptcy, higher non-performing
loan ratio or being judicially investigated during the crisis than at other times [65, 66, 68]. It evidently reveals that there exist more identified
undisciplined members in the course of financial crisis, which thus correspondingly suggests lower proportion or fewer cooperators at this time
because of fewer registered members than before (Figure. (d)).
different punishment measures must be taken into account in
framework of pool punishment.
In addition, a widely-applied game framework – public
good game (PGG) provides a good theoretical framework to
concern the public welfare in presence of pool punishment.
Group-like structure in PGG is in favor of function of pool
punishment, even though the overlap between different game
groups depends on the network structures. Another reason for
PGG model being the first choice as the present game frame-
work is that its rules are very closed to the operate modes
of many modern money-seeking organizations such as banks,
profit funds or listed companies: attracting capital and then
sharing investment gains together.
To our knowledge, in the current literature, there is no
work on evolutionary dynamics which takes into account is-
sues of self-regulation and government regulation. In gen-
eral, both types of regulations exist, and the question is how
important they are in governing the evolutionary dynamics
in different situations. In this paper we propose a general
evolutionary game model to capture the two distinct punish-
ment measures: defector-driven and cooperator-driven pun-
ishment, in the framework of PGG. Next, the evolution dy-
namics in six different evolutionary situations on well-mixed
population and networked population is detailedly treated by
mean-field theory and extensive agent-based simulations re-
spectively. Moreover, our developed semi-analytical method
is able to yield accurate estimations of the boundaries between
the phases of full defection and nondefection. We provide sev-
5eral physical understandings of the basic evolutionary dynam-
ics for different situations on the two populations, through a
detailed statistical analysis, uncovering the favorable condi-
tions under which cooperation prevalence with abundant pun-
ishers can arise.
Three striking phenomena are uncovered in this study. One
is that networked structure is overall more favorable for pun-
ishers and further for cooperation because of network reci-
procity and mutualism between punishers and cooperators
who do not punish defectors. The second phenomenon is that,
for networked populations, cooperator-driven punishment is
a more efficient measure to confer nondefectors evolutionary
advantages; however, on infinite well-mixed populations the
mix of the two punishments is a better choice to achieve a de-
sirable evolutionary outcome. Finally, of particular interest is
that, for networked population, an optimal intermediate range
of feedback sensitivity for prevalence of punishers is identi-
fied. We give a clear physical picture to help us understand
how this phenomenon happens, through a detailed statistical
analysis of spatial pattern formations in different evolution sit-
uations.
The paper is organized as follows. We firstly give a detailed
description of our model in Sec. II. In Sec. III, in turn, we
firstly implement our model for six different evolutionary sit-
uations on infinite well-mixed population through theoretical
approach, and then extend our study to networked populations
by means of agent-based simulations. Finally, we present dis-
cussions and conclusions with an outlook in Sec. IV.
II. MODEL
In our model, regulations or policing involvements are di-
rectly assumed to be punitive measures so that one can de-
sign feasible model for analytical and numerical studies of the
effectiveness of two different punishments in different evolu-
tionary situations. In reality, regulations may create costs as
well as benefits from the increasing levels of disciplined be-
haviors, so one should consider the cost of punishment in the
model in addition to the punishment fine to quantify the puni-
tive effects in terms of high-order benefits (i.e., the emergence
and persistence of cooperators or prosocial punishers). In the
matter of regulation of industry, the key players in the pro-
motion of public interests have always been businesses, SRO,
government and consumer advocates; which should be con-
sidered as basic ingredients or strategies in our present model.
Accordingly, there are four strategies within the framework
of PGG: traditional cooperation (i. e. nonpunishing coopera-
tion) (TC), defection (D), cooperator-driven punishment (CP)
and defector-driven punishment (DP); and correspondingly
four types of individuals: traditional cooperators (nonpunish-
ing cooperators), defectors, cooperator-driven and defector-
driven punishers. Of particular note here is that the execu-
tion probabilities of cooperator-driven punishment (CP) and
defector-driven punishment (DP) are mainly determined by
the fractions of cooperators and defectors within the game
group, respectively; which is also the concrete definition of
the two punishment measures in our model. As another pun-
ishment measure, traditional punishment (TP) is usually im-
plemented when there is at least one defector in the group,
and thus widely-adopted. However, we have checked that this
punishment strategy remains rather vulnerable and negligible,
especially when CP or DP is present. It reveals that CP and
DP are effective ways to regulate defectors in the institution
rather than TP, at least within the framework of the present
model. Hence this punishment is not considered in our present
model. For simplicity, in our model the punishment mecha-
nism is only stated on prosocial punishment, i.e., punishers
adopt cooperation strategy before punishing defectors, which
means that no other mechanisms such as antisocial punish-
ment [71–73] or selfish punishment [17] are captured.
According to our game rule, in the population each player
i selects Gi − 1 individuals from the population to form a
game group in which each group member can simultane-
ously play PGG with other group members, by holding the
same strategy. In detail, in the game group each coopera-
tor makes a contribution of 1 to the public good, while de-
fectors contribute nothing. Subsequently, the sum of all the
contributions in the group is multiplied by the synergy factor
1 < r < Gi, which quantifies synergistic effects of coop-
eration. Then the resulting amount is equally shared among
all members in the group. After the intervention of punish-
ments, there are two different cases to be considered for a
member i adopting cooperation strategy: (1) the payoff of i
will be ΠgP = r(NTC + NCP + NDP )/Gi − 1 − NDα/nP
if she/he carries out punishment upon defectors in the group
at a probability g, as either a cooperator-driven punisher (CP)
or a defector-driven punisher (DP); (2) otherwise the payoff
of i is ΠgP = Π
g
TC = r(NTC + NCP + NDP )/Gi − 1
which is also the payoffs of traditional cooperators in the
group. Herein NTC , ND, NP , NCP and NDP are, respec-
tively, the number of traditional cooperators, defectors, pun-
ishers, cooperator-driven punishers, and defector-driven pun-
ishers in the group. Therefore, NP = NCP + NDP . Mean-
while it must be stressed that np is the number of punishments
exerted by punishers rather than the total number of the two
types of punishers, while α is the punishment fine that each
defector in the group incurs in presence of punishment. In the
case that i is a defector, ΠgD = r(NTC + NCP + NDP )/Gi
if nP = 0, or else Π
g
D = r(NTC + NCP + NDP )/Gi − α.
Importantly, the values of α are kept the same for cooperator-
driven and defector-driven punishment so as to not give either
a default evolutionary advantage or disadvantage.
More precisely, according to the definition of DP and CP,
the probability (i.e., g) that the two types of punishments are
implemented by corresponding punishers is dominated by the
fractions of different strategies in the group, in the following
specific way: {
gDP = A
ND
G ,
gCP = A
NC
G .
(1)
where gCP and gDP indicate the probability at which
cooperator-driven and defector-driven punisher to carry out an
exertion, respectively. NC = NTC+NCP +NDP denotes the
total number of nondefectors (including traditional coopera-
tors, cooperator-driven and defector-driven cooperators) in the
6group. Parameter A ∈ [0, 1] quantifies punishers’ feedback
sensitivity. In more detail, larger value indicates more sen-
sitive punishers and larger difference between the two types
of punishers in terms of their behavior modes, and thus more
exerted punishments with respect to the same fractions of de-
fectors (nondefectors) in the group.
Furthermore, Eq. 1 reveals that the two types of pun-
ishers have two opposite feedback modes. More precisely,
defector-driven punishers prefer to implement punishment to
bring the population back from brink of collapse caused by
abundant defectors, regardless of vast amount of punishment
costs which could greatly reduce their payoffs. In contrast,
cooperator-driven punishers are more likely to take actions
insofar as a good number of nondefectors who can share the
costs induced by the punishment, in purpose of reserving their
payoffs firstly. To some extent DP and CP construct a new
kind of social dilemma with traditional cooperators other than
the traditional dilemma consisting of traditional cooperators
and defectors. As ’prudent’ guys, traditional cooperators play
the role of second-order free riders because they consequently
preserve higher payoffs than those punishers, with doing noth-
ing to fight against wrong-doers.
In what follows, we will explore the evolutionary dynam-
ics through both mean-field theory concerning infinite well-
mixed situation and agent-based simulations in structured
populations under various parameter conditions. We have
checked that localized interactions on the square lattice with
〈k〉 = 4 can lead to obvious inconsistencies between analyti-
cal predictions and simulations, by means of both great evolu-
tionary advantages conferred to the nondefectors and consid-
erable critical slowing down of the system. Moreover, elim-
inating critical slowing down of the system with fewer con-
nections is difficult and rather time-consuming. Therefore the
structured population in our study is instead curved with a
regular lattice with mean degree 〈k〉 = 6 and with periodic
conditions, with reserving novel findings from our model.
On the network of size N , an over-lapping game group con-
tains all the nearest neighbors of the focal individual in addi-
tion to itself, where each individual simultaneously plays the
game. At the same time, each player i holds a PGG played
by Gi = ki + 1 group members (together with all his/her
neighbors), in addition to participating in ki games initiated
by his/her neighbors; where ki is the number of focal individ-
ual’s neighbors (i. e., the degree). Therefore, each individual
i simultaneously plays ki+1 PGGs by holding the same strat-
egy.
Furthermore, in the structure population Monte Carlo sim-
ulation (MC) is employed to update the strategies of players.
And random sequential updating is implemented as the updat-
ing scheme to control the evolution. Initially each player fixed
on the networks is randomly and independently designated as
either a traditional cooperator, a defector, a cooperator-driven
or defector-driven punisher. Each time step consists of N
following steps such that every player can update its strat-
egy once on average: (1) A randomly selected player i ac-
cumulates its overall payoff Πsi by playing the PGG in all
the Gi groups as a member, where Πsi is thus the sum of all
the payoffs Πgsi acquired from each individual group. The
randomly-chosen nearest neighbors j also obtains its over-
all payoff Πj in the same way. (2) Then i simulates the
strategy of j with probability given by fermi study function
Wj←−i = 1/[1 + exp((Πi − Πj)/κ)]. The function im-
plies that players owning higher payoffs are advantaged, while
adoption of strategy of a player performing worse is still pos-
sible. κ curves the noise of the uncertainty in the adoption.
Without loss of generality we set κ = 0.1 throughout this pa-
per. The simulations are performed until the system reaches
a stationary state, i. e., the populations of different strategies
become time independent or defectors go extinct.
The final densities of different strategies are averaged over
200 independent realizations to insure a low variability. The
size of the network is N = 200× 200.
III. RESULTS
Before presenting the main results, we should state that the
focus of the present study is on evolutionary dynamics under
various parameter conditions for six different combinations of
strategies: D+CP, D+DP, TC+D+CP, TC+D+DP, D+CP+DP,
and TC+D+CP+DP. Both analytical treatment based on mean-
field theory and agent-based simulations for networked popu-
lation are employed to enable a full exploration. Correspond-
ingly, for an available comparison, there are two parts to be
presented in this section: the first is for analytical predictions
from infinite well-mixed populations while the second is for
networked population embedded on a regular lattice network.
A. Infinite well-mixed populations
The calculations, reported in Appendix A, give the follow-
ing results for different evolutionary situations, which theoret-
ically provide a complete picture of the model behavior.
Accordingly, Fig. 2 gives a complete picture about how the
effects of synergistic effects of cooperation, punishment fine
and individual sensitivity on evolution direction of the sys-
tem. Overall, larger r, α and A can confer the punishers more
evolutionary advantages, leading to the decrease of position
values pCP or pDP . In particular, this result reveals that more
sensitive punishers are able to protect the population from be-
ing corroded by defectors through more available punishment.
At the same time, second and third columns of panels (a) and
(b) indicate that the promoting effects from the punishments
and individuals’ sensitivity have an upper limit, because at-
tractive range for full punishment (FP, i. e. the system is
full of punishers) identified by the position of the interme-
diate state remains almost invariable. Negative valley in terms
of ∆p becomes visible when the parameter condition is not
so desirable for the punishers (i. e., r, α and A are small),
suggesting that CP is more effective than DP in suppressing
defectors under well-mixed conditions. As the three param-
eters getting larger, there is no significant difference between
the two types of punishment with respect to promoting public
goods; and ∆p is negative but very close to zero as a result.
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FIG. 2. Illustrations of the position of coexistence state of two strategies under various parameter conditions. The position value pCP (pDP )
indicates the position of intermediate unstable state (i.e., the open circles illustrated in Figs. 14 and 15 of Appendix. B) in the case D+CP
(D+DP), which can be used to estimate the advantages of punishment strategy. More specifically, smaller pCP or pDP is, more likely the
system would be to reach the sate of full punishment (FP). (a) Top panels is for the case D+CP; while (b) is for the case of D+DP. Specific
values of other parameters are depicted in each subplot. (c) illustrates the difference ∆p = pCP − pDP between two position values so that
we can judge which punishment is more effective in enlarging the attractive range of FP, i.e., promoting the public cooperation.
Whatever, none of the punishers can occupy a superior posi-
tion in face of defectors, which is confirmed by the phenom-
ena pCP > 0.5(pDP > 0.5) in Figs. 2(a) and (b).
Next, we shift our attention to the three-strategy situations:
TC+D+CP, TC+D+DP, and TC+CP+DP. Fig. 3 reveals the
monotonous effects of facilitating the advantages of nonde-
fectors of synergy effect, punishment fine and feedback sensi-
tivity, through presenting the ratios of attraction basins of SP
under various parameter conditions (please see Figs. 16, 17,
18 and corresponding descriptions for more detailed informa-
tion of attraction basin patterns for the three-strategy situa-
tions). While an obvious saturation effect can be found in the
case D+CP+DP, where the ratios reach a limited intermediate
value with increasing punishment fine or feedback sensitiv-
ity (see the second and third subplot in Fig. 3 (c)). Secondly,
comparatively higher ratios suggest that mix of CP and DP
works better in sustaining the public goods without involve-
ment of second-order free riders i.e., traditional cooperators;
which is in accordance with the conclusion from the empirical
studies that combination of self-regulation and government
oversight lead to a better performance in improving market
track [33, 46]. On the other hand, it can be noticed in the cases
with sole punishment that the performance of synergy effect
goes through a sharp transition from being unimpressive to be-
ing rather remarkable near the point r = G above which non-
defectors (ND) dominate while all defectors die out, which is
more or less in agreement with the findings of the previous
works [71].
Furthermore, Figs. 4 and 5 together provide a comprehen-
sive picture of strategy fractions in the parameter plane of
(A, α) for six different evolution situations, as well as semi-
analytically estimated boundary lines and volume ratios of at-
traction basins of segment punishment (SP, the state where
punishment is found to be coexisted with other strategies)
for the case TC+D+CP+DP. Especially, fTC , fCP and fDP
represent the final steady fractions of traditional cooperators,
cooperator-driven punishers and defector-driven punishers in
the population, respectively. Most obviously, the regions of
ND phase are found to be in the top-right corner, which can be
considered as a support for the observed monotonous effects
of facilitating the advantages of nondefectors of r, α and A
from another perspective. Since there are much more cost of
punishment defectors have to bear, induced by both more fre-
quent exerted punishments and larger cost of one punishment.
It can also be expected that the semi-analytical approach rely-
ing on well-mixed assumption can give ’perfect’ boundaries
to distinguish SP phases from FP phases. Cooperator-driven
punishers are in a disadvantaged position in face of tradi-
tional cooperators or even defector-driven punishers (more
traditional cooperators or defector-driven punishers exist in
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FIG. 3. The ratios of the areas of attraction basins of SP state versus r, α or A; for three different evolution situations: (a) TC+D+CP, (b)
TC+D+DP and (c) D+CP+DP.
FIG. 4. The analytical dependence of the final steady fractions of different nondefective strategies on both A and α for different evolutionary
situations: (a) D+CP, (b) D+DP, (c1) and (c2) TC+D+CP, (d1) and (d2) TC+D+DP, (e1) and (e2) D+CP+DP. The initial conditions for each
case are: (a) fCP (0) = 0.54, (b) fDP (0) = 0.54, (c1) and (c2) fCP (0) = 0.45 and fTC(0) = 0.22, (d1) and (d2) fDP (0) = 0.53 and
fTC(0) = 0.05, (e1) and (e2) fCP (0) = 0.3 and fDP (0) = 0.25. Correspondingly, the values of fs used to semi-analytically estimate the
boundary lines are (see Appendix C for further details): (a) fCP = 0.54, (b) fDP = 0.54, (c1) and (c2) fTC = 0.22 and fCP = 0.356, (d1)
and (d2) fTC = 0.05 and fDP = 0.492, (e1) and (e2) fCP = 0.3 and fDP = 0.25. In all cases, the value of synergy factor is r = 4.0.
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the final state, see Figs. 4 (c1) (c2), (e1) (e2), and Figs. 5 (d)-
(f)). Further support for requiring a non-trivial interplay be-
tween defector-driven and cooperator-driven punishers in pro-
moting the public cooperation is also verified in Fig. 4 (e1)
and (e2) where a larger region of ND phase is existed. At
this point, CP is frequently enforced when nondefectors dom-
inate the population while DP efficiently works on condition
that defectors become the majority. Therefore sufficient avail-
able punishments are always provided in spite of the strat-
egy abundances. Especially through a deep comparison of the
illustrations in Fig. 3 with the ratios in Fig. 5, we can say
the transition in terms of ratio is mainly due to synergistic ef-
fects from cooperation, instead of punishments themselves. In
other words, punishment fine and feedback sensitivity are the
parameters that mainly govern the performance of punishment
measures in an infinite well-mixed population. Finally, com-
bining with the two figures, we can find traditional coopera-
tors are traditionally held responsible for preventing the dom-
inance of cooperator-driven and defector-driven punishers, in
accordance with conclusions from previous studies [10–12].
B. Networked populations
The study of present model under infinite well-mixed con-
dition reveals the monotonous effects of synergistic effects,
punishment fine and feedback sensitivity in facilitating the
public cooperation. In accordance with the conclusions
from few previous empirical studies involving internet co-
regulation [74], combination action of CP and DP gives bet-
ter performance. Besides, a non-negligible deviation from the
reality is that CP is always outperformed by DP or TC. How-
ever, in reality, interactions among individuals are not typi-
cally random but rather highly structured, i. e., each individ-
ual has a fixed neighborhood to some extent [75–77]. Tak-
ing this realistic factor into consideration, we find some novel
and counterintuitive results which has not been uncovered in
a well-mixed population.
Firstly, Figs. 6 and 7 together exhibit what role feedback
sensitivity plays in governing the evolution dynamics in six
different evolution situations. Of particular interest is that an
optimal intermediate range of the sensitivity A for prevalence
or even complete dominance of punishers can be found un-
der suitable parameter conditions in each situation. It is defi-
nitely different from what happens in well-mixed populations.
More specifically, in the case that cooperator-driven punish-
ers face defectors alone, the peaks of fCP become wider un-
til a threshold of punishment fine above which it exhibits an
monotonic increase (see Fig. 6(a)). After the introduction of
traditional cooperators, more sharp peaks of fCP can be ob-
served for large α, along with a shift of these peaks toward
smaller A with increasing punishment fine (see Fig. 6(c2)). In
contrast, the emergence of optimal intermediate ranges of A
for dominance of defector-driven punishers is instead facili-
tated by large punishment fine for which either two peaks of
fDP are present when traditional cooperators are additionally
introduced (see Fig. 6(b) and (d2)). In the cases consider-
ing sole punishment, the positions of peaks remain more or
less independent of whether TC’s intervention. However, the
optimal intermediate ranges of feedback sensitivity A would
shrink (see Figs. 6), which still holds in the cases with mix
of punishments (see Figs. 6(e1) (e2) and Figs. 7(b) (c)). This
arises from the fact that punishers would suffer from second-
order free-riding behaviors, which also contributes to mono-
tonic increase of traditional cooperators with the growth of
punishers (Figs. 6(c1) and (d1), and Fig. 7(a)). Additionally, a
key hint for competitive relationship between the two types of
punishers is also revealed by the results presented in Fig. 6(e1)
and (e2) that positions of population peaks of DP correspond
rightly to the valleys of CP population in case that punishment
fine is large enough. Figs. 6(e1) (e2) and Figs 7(b) also show
that stronger punishment indicated by higher α does not al-
ways mean higher achievable levels of CP in the population
as both punishment measures are taken together. There is also
an optimal intermediate ranges of α for the prevalence of CP
individuals. In presence of all four strategies, peaks of fCP
rather than fDP still occur for large α (Figs 7(b) and (c)). Fi-
nally, by comparing Fig. 6(a) with (b) or Figs. 6(c1)(c2) and
(d1)(d2), we note that CP is more efficient than DP with re-
spect to maintaining public goods, by promoting a wider range
ofA for prevalence of punishers with smaller punishment fine.
The microscopic mechanism behind the reported optimal
intermediate feedback sensitivity in the case D+CP is rather
uncovered by the behaviors of different key statistical char-
acterizing quantities presented in Fig. 8. In particular, the
spectrum of payoff gaps ∆CP−D(nCP , nD) and different
states of edges ECP−D(nCP , nD) presented in Fig. 8 reveal
more detailed information about the spatial pattern forma-
tions. When A is small, unresponsive CP individuals would
exert too few punishment on defectors within the groups,
leaving the expand opportunities to defectors. The fractions
of cooperator-driven punishers thus decrease to zero. Con-
versely, for large A cooperator-driven punishers are too sen-
sitive to punish too many defectors of different groups, which
could greatly reduces punishers’ payoffs (see the third plot in
the top panels of Fig. 8) especially those with fewer than three
connected punishers (Fig. 8), and further rise to shrink of their
formed islands. This implies that optimal feedback sensitiv-
ity to maximize CP population should be intermediate. Under
such parameter condition, cooperator-driven punishers could
not only defeat defectors through sufficient and strong punish-
ment (large α) but also maintain competitive advantages (es-
pecially those owning less than three neighbors of the same
strategy, see the middle panels in Fig. 8) at the borders of CP
clusters so as to finally expand permanently by absorbing de-
fectors. Especially, the isolated cooperator-driven punishers
nearby the clusters or those at the tip of peninsulas locating
at the borders of clusters are pioneers of expansions. The
indispensable role of the two types of pioneers for CP clus-
ters is revealed by the illustrated spectrum in Fig. 8 in which
one can find that whether the punishers owning less than three
connected punishers have higher payoffs than those defective
neighbors with the same neighborhood state is mainly respon-
sible for the final dominance of punishers. As a result, there
are considerable long-standing edges of corresponding states
for optimal values of A (the red patterns shown in middle plot
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of middle panels in Fig. 8). The similar mechanism leading to
the dominance of defector-driven punishers in case D+DP is
also revealed by the illustrations in Fig. 19 listed in Appendix.
B. Whatever, both types of punishers are inclined to cluster-
ing because of their prosocial nature i.e., adopting cooperation
strategy before exerting punishment. However, larger punish-
ment fine is required as a remedy to weak network reciprocity
caused by defector-driven punishers.
The observed behaviors in Figs. 8 and 19 provide a refined
physical picture of clustering behaviors of punishers at two
distinctly different stages: (1) At pre-cluster stage, owing to
different sources to dive punishment executions, cooperator-
driven punishers prefer to reduce punishment so as to pre-
serve more competitive payoffs while defector-driven punish-
ers have limited payoffs resulting from more frequent execu-
tions. Meanwhile support from network reciprocity is lacking,
because compact clusters are not yet formed so early in the
process. It turns out that cooperator-driven punishers are more
likely to persevere to organize themselves into clusters, and
therefore the required minimum size for growth of clusters
is smaller than that of defector-driven punishers. (2) At the
post-cluster stage, defector-driven punishers become instead
conservative in punishing defectors. At this point, cooperator-
driven punishers have strong support from the formed clus-
ters on the one hand, and on the other hand there are enough
sources to drive them to provide a sufficiently effective pun-
ishment. To sum up, in the two-strategy cases, cooperator-
driven punishers are superior to defector-driven individuals in
terms of both taking advantages of network reciprocity and
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FIG. 8. Understanding evolutionary dynamics of the networked populations for three representative values of A: (a) A = 0.14, (b) A = 0.26
and (c) A = 0.92, in case D+CP. Five key statistical characterizing quantities are shown for r = 4.0 and α = 1.0: the fractions of cooperator-
driven punishers fCP (t) (the first subplot in the top panels); the fractions of edges connecting the punishers to defectors fCP−D(t) (the second
subplot in the top panels) which are normalized by the total number of edges in the networks; the mean payoff gap between a cooperator-
driven punisher and its connected defector among whom an imitation process happens ∆CP−D(t) =
E
′
CP−D(t)∑
(ΠCP − ΠD)/E′CP−D(t)
(the third subplot in the top panels, and E
′
CP−D(t) represents the number of total occurrences of imitation process among CPs and Ds at
time t); the payoff-gap spectrum (∆CP−D(nCP , nD)) of ∆CP−D(t) for 36 different neighborhood states which is determined by the number
of cooperator-driven punishers can be found in their neighbors (the middle panels), where nCP (nD) represents the number of cooperator-
driven punishers can be found in neighbors of a cooperator-driven punisher (defector); the number spectrum of 36 different states of edges
ECP−D(nCP , nD) whose states are determined by the number of cooperator-driven punishers the two ends respectively have. In detail, the
six numbers marked on the y label indicate the possible number of neighbors who are found to be cooperator-driven punishers for a cooperator-
driven punsiher. There are thus six scales for each number (grid box), each of which respectively indicates the numbers of cooperator-driven
punishers the defective neighbor has (from bottom to top: the number of punitive neighbors of this defector is 0-5), rising to 36 scales in total.
suppressing defectors.
Fig. 9 gives the quantitative traits of representative spa-
tial evolution of the three competing strategies: TC, D and
CP, for parameter values that yield different absorbing phases.
Remarkably the additional participation of traditional coop-
erators can produce somewhat different evolution picture in
which cooperator-driven punishers can possibly outperform
defectors to leave survival spaces for traditional cooperators,
and further form a stable coexistence with them. When A is
small, unresponsive cooperator-driven are naturally defeated
by defectors and finally extincted, along with disappearance of
TC. As the sensitivity A increases, cooperator-driven punish-
ers begin to conquer the whole network attributing to the same
mechanism which has been uncovered in the two-strategy
cases. This rises to occurrence of positive peak of fCP−D(t)
(the fractions of edge CP-D) as well as ∆nCP−D(t) (net in-
crease of cooperator-driven punishers) (see Fig. 9). As the
sensitivity is increased further, it can be observed slightly pos-
itive fCP−D(t) and larger positive peaks of fTC−D(t) indi-
cated by pink markers in Fig. 9. In such cases, we have uncov-
ered a strong mutualism between TC and CP, single-strategy
clusters of whom cannot be persisted in the sea of defectors.
Also, traditional cooperators at the borders of CP clusters ac-
tually play a role of ’protective film’ which spatially isolate
the punishers bearing additional punishment cost from those
defectors, and thus prevent them from being eroded. This
in turn gives these traditional cooperators i.e., second-order
free riders advantaged position (slightly positive ∆TC−D in-
dicated by pink and black markers in Fig. 9) to outperform
their defective neighbors whose payoffs have been greatly re-
duced by punishers within the same game groups. That is
why fTC−D(t) and fCP−TC(t) are obviously positive while
fCP−D(t) is approximated to zero (the second-row panels
in Fig. 9). Meanwhile, the dynamics is formulated by the
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FIG. 9. The dynamic changes of statistical characterizing quantities for four different representative values of A in networked populations. In
detail, from top to bottom rows, these statistical characterizing quantities are: the fractions of cooperator-driven punishers fCP (t) (traditional
cooperators, fTC(t)) in the population; the fractions of three different edges (CP-D, TC-D and CP-TC) which are normalized by the total
number of edges in the population (the middle panels), where fCP−D(t), fTC−D(t) and fCP−TC(t) denote the fractions of corresponding
edges respectively; the mean payoff gaps between the two ends of an edge at which an imitation process among different strategies happens,
which is defined in the same manner proposed in caption of Fig. 8; the net increase of cooperator-driven punsihers (traditional cooperators)
who are produced from the imitation process between defectors (traditional cooperators) and cooperator-driven punishers or traditional co-
operators (cooperator-driven punishers) at time t (the bottom panels), e.g. ∆nCP−D(t) = nD→CP (t) − nCP→D(t) where nD→CP (t)
(nCP→D(t)) indicates the number of occurrences of imitation process which successfully translates a defector (cooperator-driven punisher)
into a cooperator-driven punisher (defector) at time t. Other parameters are r = 4.0 and α = 4.0.
majority-like rule in the areas far from the borders of the clus-
ters, on account of the fact that there is no difference between
TC and CP individuals in absence of defectors. Correspond-
ingly, there are a large number of edges CP-TC of which the
two ends have equal payoffs (∆CP−TC(t) is approximately
zero from beginning to end); however, positive ∆nCP−TC(t)
reveals a considerable translations from TC to CP (the forth-
row panels in Fig. 9).
The system also presents the similar dynamical traits in the
case TC+D+DP, as shown in Figs. 20, 21 listed in Appendix
B. However, it is worth noting that DP clusters are not as
strong as CP clusters in terms of resisting defectors, owing
to the fact that defector-driven punishers become unrespon-
sive as they clustering (as punishment-driven sources, defec-
tors within the same game groups become fewer in number).
As another consequence, DP clusters are less favorable for the
survival of surrounding traditional cooperators, and these co-
operators are more dependent on network reciprocity so as to
form more rounded clusters (the forth and fifth row panels in
Fig. 21). Thinner layers consisting of small TC clusters can
also be found (see Fig. 21).
We have checked that the results for the evolutionary
situation D+CP+DP are consistent with the illustrations in
Fig. 6(e1)(e2) that cooperator-driven punishers are prior to
defector-driven ones. The results reveal that cooperator-
driven punishers’ prevalence depends mainly on that they are
more successful in the battle against defectors. Furthermore,
cooperator-driven punishers seem more essential for survival
of defector-driven punishers. Since DP clusters cannot per-
sist, and they have to combine with CP clusters who can fully
take advantage of network reciprocity (for more details, see
Fig. 22, along with corresponding descriptions).
Given the condition that all four strategies are present, one
can expect the following evolutionary patterns of different
strategy clusters shown in Fig. 10, based on the mechanisms
uncovered for three-strategy cases: Unlike TC and DP clus-
ters, CP clusters can exist alone in the face of defectors; while
DP or TC clusters have to combine with each other or with CP
clusters. DP or CP clusters are more or less enfolded by tradi-
tional cooperators for large sensitivity A, indicating the estab-
lishment of an additional mutualism between traditional coop-
erators and the two types of punishers. The majority-like rule
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FIG. 10. Representative spatial evolution of the four strategies TC, D CP and DP in networked populations for four representative values of A.
Depicted are snapshots of the Hexagonal lattice with size L = 200, where the punishment fine is α = 4.0. Cooperators (defectors) are shown
in dark red (dark blue), while cooperator-driven (defector-driven) punishers are depicted in orange (light blue).
still formulate the dynamics in the interiors of nondefectors’
clusters where there is no essential distinction between pun-
ishers and traditional cooperators, which can be considered
as the key mechanism behind the competitive relationship be-
tween the two types of punishers, as also shown in FIg. 6. CP
is superior to TC and DP for a wide range of the sensitivity A
especially when the parameter is intermediate. Furthermore,
Figs. 6 reveals that the above-mentioned microscopic mech-
anisms for three-strategy cases do not rely on any additional
strategic complexity limiting its general validity.
Since stochastic imitation of a neighboring strategy ensures
the existence of (homogeneous) absorbing states and critical
phase transitions. We have also explicitly explored the dy-
namic behaviors of the system in the close vicinity of transi-
tion points above which the system shifts from FD phase to FP
phase. In the case of D+CP, it can be observed in Fig. 11(a)
that in the close vicinity of transition point, the final outcome
in the two cases is remarkably different while the difference
in the sensitivity A is minute, which is a characteristic feature
of discontinuous phase transition. Moreover, similar but more
obvious discontinuous behaviors in terms of the fractions of
either DPs or CPs can be produced in the cases TC+D+DP,
D+CP+DP and TC+D+CP+DP (see Fig. 11(b)-(d)) and other
evolutionary situations. This is in accordance with what have
been uncovered from the previous studies involving pool pun-
ishment against defectors [12].
Finally, Figs. 12 and 13 provide a comprehensive picture
in the parameter plane of (A, α) of the evolutionary dynam-
ics, as well as semi-analytically estimated boundary lines (see
Appendix C for more details). The boundaries between the
regions of different nondefective strategies are not given. By
means of the displayed results in Fig. 11, note that a discon-
tinuous phase transition always occurs when the system shifts
from FD phase to FP phase, instead of continuous phase tran-
sition from FD phase to SP phase; which is irrespective of
the complexity of evolutionary situations. The discontinuous
phase transition is due to the positive feedback arising from
the fact that moderately sensitive punishers begin to firstly
clustering, and then keep growing to completely dominate the
whole population along with the extinction of traditional co-
operators; while the continuous phase transition stems from
increasing competitiveness of punishers strengthen by punish-
ment α [73] and persistence of traditional cooperators. Over-
all, CP can more effectively enforce a regulation to promote
and sustain public goods through enlarging the regions of ND
phase, and thus be more prompt than DP; especially in ab-
sence of traditional cooperators. More specifically, perfor-
mances of cooperator-driven punishers can be weakened by
free-riding behaviors of traditional cooperators (see Fig. 12(a)
and 12(c1), 12(c2)) who, however, may greatly help defector-
driven punishers to beat defectors in a much larger parame-
ter space (see Fig. 12(b) and 12(d1), 12(d2)). In both cases,
two types of punishers in turn provides survival space for tra-
ditional cooperators, and hence regions of TC more or less
coincide the those of DP or CP phase (see Fig. 12(c1),12(c2)
and 12(d1), 12(d2)), but not totally. In the presence of more
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FIG. 11. Evolution of the fractions of cooperator-driven punishers over time, starting with a random initial state. The results are presented for
four different evolutionary situations: (a) D+CP, (b) TC+D+DP, (c) D+CP+DP and (d) TC+D+CP+DP, and in the close vicinity of transition
points. The values of punishment fine are (a) α = 1.8, (b) α = 4.4, (b) α = 6.0 and (d) α = 6.0, respectively. The other parameter is r = 4.0.
FIG. 12. The dependence of simulated final steady fractions of different nondefection strategies on both A and α, where the results for five
different evolution situations are respectively illustrated: (a) D+CP, (b) D+DP, (c1) and (c2) TC+D+CP, (d1) and (d2) TC+D+DP, (e1) and
(e2) D+CP+DP. The population is networked, and the other parameter is r = 4.0. Correspondingly, the value of fs used to semi-analytically
estimate the boundary lines are (see Appendix C for further details): (a) fCP = 1.0, (b) fDP = 0.96, (c1) fTC = 0.1 and fCP = 0.55, (c2)
fTC = 0.1 and fCP = 0.71 (d1) fTC = 0.115 and fDP = 0.465, (e1) fCP = 0.1 and fDP = 0.84.
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FIG. 13. The dependence of simulated final steady fractions of three different nondefection strategies on both A and α. The population is
networked, where four strategies TC, D, CP and DP are considered. Correspondingly, the values of fs used to semi-analytically estimate the
boundary line are: (a) fTC = 0.09, fDP = 0.09 and fCP = 0.46; (b) fTC = 0, fDP = 0 and fCP = 0.8. The other parameter is r = 4.0.
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than two strategies, the optimal parameter regions for different
nondefective strategies repel each other especially between
the two punishing strategies, as a result of the majority-like
rule. Meanwhile, this rule rises to another notable result that
performance of CP is more or less limited by DP. Also, non-
monotonic changes of freqwe alternatively uencies of both
punishing strategies are more clearly illustrated, which is the
consequence of both network reciprocity and the majority-like
rule among nondefective individuals. Finally, notice that the
semi-analytic estimated boundaries successfully distinguish
the simulated regions of NP phases from the whole param-
eter space, although there is deviation in the case of D+DP for
largeA (Fig. 13(b)). This discrepancy is attributed to a vicious
circle between defectors and defector-driven punishers: more
defectors the punishers punish, lower payoffs they have, and
thus more of them get eroded. Finally, there are more defec-
tors to further drive the punishers to exert punishments with
a higher probability. Consequently, defector-driven punishers
go extinct in a much larger parameter region than theoretical
expectation based on well-mixed situation; which is exacer-
bated in the ranges of large A.
By comparing with the results shown in Figs. 23 and 13
with corresponding analytical predictions given by Figs. 4 and
5 with the initial conditions unchanged, we can conclude that
networked structure of the population is essential for supe-
rior performance of cooperator-driven punishers to defector-
driven ones. Hence the system can achieve more desirable
level of public goods.
IV. DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
To summarize, empirical explorations of corporate self-
regulation and government regulation suggest two different
punishment measures which play indispensable roles in regu-
latory issues, calling for a general game model to take into ac-
count both the types of punishments. We have accomplished
that in this paper. For the purpose of fully identifying both the
interactions among different strategies and the performances
of the two punishments, we have considered six different evo-
lutionary situations with and without traditional cooperation,
in which one or both punishment strategies are introduced to
fight against defectors. In addition, we have proposed a the-
oretical approach to completely describing the evolutionary
dynamics of the six different combinations of strategies in an
infinite well-mixed population. Next, agent-based simulations
are employed to give numerical results for networked popula-
tions embedded on a regular lattice. At the same time, we
have developed a semi-analytical method which allows us to
give relatively accurate estimations of the boundaries between
full-defection and nondefection phases in most evolutionary
situations.
For the infinite well-mixed population, we firstly use a
series of replicator equations capturing features of present
model to give gradients of selection for two-strategy cases,
phase portraits for three-strategy cases, and ratios of attrac-
tion basins of nondefection for the cases with more than two
strategies. The study of the population has revealed that in-
volvement of both punishments is more effective than one of
the punishments alone in sustaining cooperation, based on two
respects: larger scopes of the attraction basins of full nonde-
fection and larger region sizes of nondefection phases. The
mechanism behind this result can be attributed to the fact
that abundant available punishments against defectors are pro-
vided by the two types of punishers at different evolution
stages, respectively. Next, the analytical results have sug-
gested monotonous effect of synergy effect, punishment fine
and feedback sensitivity on facilitating the advantages of non-
defectors in terms of scopes of the attraction basins of full
nondefection. Further support about the same effect is ob-
tained by giving a comprehensive picture of strategy fractions
in the parameter plane of (A, α) for six different evolution sit-
uations: When both A and α are large enough, nondefection
phases appears. Since both frequent available punishments
and large cost of one punishment are imposed on defectors. Of
particular note is that cooperator-driven punishment is over-
all uncompetitive in presence of defector-driven punishment,
however, slightly more favorable for nondefectors. In addi-
tion, punishment fine and feedback sensitivity turn out to be
the key parameters to govern the performances of punishment
measures in such population. By means of the semi-analytical
method, we have given boundaries to accurately distinguish
nondefection phases from full defection phases for each evo-
lutionary situation, through roughly estimating the fractions
of different nondefective strategies nearby the boundaries.
Whatever, traditional cooperators can undermine the evolu-
tionary advantages of punishers [10–12], even though in the
desirable situations that the cooperation is further promoted
by both the punishment measures together.
For networked population, agent-based simulations of the
evolutionary dynamics generates more rich results. In com-
parison to the findings under infinite well-mixed condition,
networked structure are overall more favorable for the survival
or even dominance of nondefectors i.e. sustaining the public
cooperation, which is supported by the comparison of com-
prehensive pictures for two different populations. We have
obtained a physical original of this phenomenon through a de-
tailed statistical analysis of the emerging spatial patterns in
terms of the frequencies of different types of strategies and
edges, mean payoff gaps between the two ends of edges con-
necting two individuals with different strategies, net increase
of different nondefectors, payoff-gap and number spectrums
of different states of edges. The analysis has revealed that it
can be attributed to two major factors: (1) support from net-
work reciprocity in any case; (2) mutualism betweeen tradi-
tional cooperators and punishers that works in the cases with
traditional cooperation. Quite remarkably, the punishers help
traditional cooperators to reduce the competitive ability of de-
fectors in the vicinity of punishers’ clusters to some extent.
Whereas traditional cooperators who are effectively second-
order free-riding on the punishments, form an active layer
around punishers, which protects them against defectors. Mu-
tualism between the punishers and traditional cooperators is
thus established. Especially as a consequence of the strong
mutualism, traditional cooperators can counterintuitively and
largely facilitate the prevalence of defector-driven punishers.
18
While it turns out that cooperator-driven punishers are always
vulnerable to the same second-order free-riding. Another in-
teresting point is that cooperator-driven punishment is proved
to be a more powerful measure than defector-driven punish-
ment with respect to enlarging the scopes of favorable param-
eters and promoting cooperation, by virtue of their great abil-
ity to fully take advantage of network reciprocity. This find-
ing is in accordance with the empirical conclusions that self-
regulation is superior to government regulation for benefiting
consumers, businesses and the economy [32, 37, 78].
Moreover, unlike what happens in the infinite well-
mixed population, to have a desirable evolutionary outcome
with high-level cooperation in the network, an intermediate
range of feedback sensitivity is surprisingly needed. While
monotonous effect of synergy effect, punishment fine and
feedback sensitivity on facilitating the advantages of tradi-
tional cooperators rather than punishers has been still iden-
tified. The statistical analysis of spatial pattern formations has
also provided a physical understanding. For small sensitiv-
ity, punishments from unresponsive punishers are lacking, and
thus unable to sustain nondefectors’s survival. Conversely, if
the sensitivity is large, over-sensitive punishers would pun-
ish too many defectors so that they cannot have competitive
payoffs in comparison to defectors. Therefore intermediate
sensitivity is an optimal choice of punsihers. We have found
that under such parameter condition punishers cannot only de-
feat defectors through sufficient punishments but also main-
tain competitive advantages to get clustering in time, leading
to persistent growth of nondefectors’ clusters. Furthermore, in
the vicinity of the borders of nondefectors’ clusters, isolated
cooperator-driven punishers or those at the tip of peninsulas
are found to be pioneers of expansions. In addition, it is also
worth noticing that our semi-analytical approach fails to give
a relatively accurate boundary in the situation with defectors
and defector-driven punishers, given that feedback sensitiv-
ity is large. This discrepancy is attributed to the vicious cir-
cle arised from strategic nature of defector-driven punishers,
which also causes the poorer performance of defector-driven
punishment in networked population. Finally, explorations of
the frequencies of different strategies as function of feedback
sensitivity or both the sensitivity and punishment fine have
disclosed a competitive relationship among nondefectors, es-
pecially among cooperator-driven and defector-driven punsi-
hers. This is the result of the majority-like rule which fre-
quently happens within nondefectors’ clusters.
Relating to the reality, we conclude our work by providing
two general remarks. Firstly, our study has uncovered poten-
tial favorable conditions for operations of self-regulation and
government regulation. More precisely, in the social or eco-
nomic systems with imperfect information induced by spa-
tial structure, self-regulation can be accepted as a useful tool
to sustain commons and eliminate the conflicts of interest;
particularly when self-regulation organizations have an in-
termediate response speed, and whose regulations are strong
enough. Conversely, if the state of the whole system is known
to the individuals (like internet system), mix of the two types
of regulations may be a better choice to achieve optimal pub-
lic goals, such as internet co-regulation scheme [74]. From
another perspective, our study has given a possible interpre-
tation of why self-regulation has recently begun to gain wide
acceptance and interest for applications [37, 78–81]: imper-
fect information or spatial limitation in the markets or social
systems. Secondly, we can conclude from our study that reg-
ulating effects from response speed of regulation organiza-
tions are highly dependent upon information transparency (i.e.
structure) of the systems. More precisely, high information
transparency let high response speed be always essential for
a good running market. In contrast, when information trans-
parency is rather low because of spatial limitation, selecting
an intermediate response speed is a better choice for regula-
tion organizations such as SROs.
Finally, we must stress that our present model does cap-
ture top-down prescriptive rules of government regulation,
as well as third party certification schemes or government
whatchdogs [74, 82] which may result in better firm behavior.
For self-regulation, we avoid the adversarial problem about
putting the fox in charge of the hen house; which is beyond
our present research. Whatever, our present study has devel-
oped a computational and theoretical paradigm to understand
the relative roles played by SROs and government regulation
(external powerful force such as troops) in the framework of
game theory, which has potential implications not only to self-
regulation but also to other topics in economics and political
science. We hope to be able to extend our analysis to tempo-
ral networks [83] or multilayer networks [84–87], as well as
to more complex situations by considering above mentioned
realistic mechanisms or antisocial punishment [9, 71–73].
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APPENDIX A
The evolutionary dynamics of the studied system can be
analytically described by a set of replicator equations [25, 88]:
dfs(t)
dt
= fs(t)(Πs −Π) (2)
, where fs and Πs indicate the fractions of individuals owning
strategy s ∈ {TC, D, CP, DP} and their correspondingly
expected payoff in theoretical analysis, respectively. While
Π =
∑
s
fs(t)Πs denotes the average payoff of the entire pop-
ulation. Theoretically the expected payoff for each strategy s
could be further given by
Πs =
∑
0≤Ni≤G−1
(G− 1)!∏
i
Ni!
∏
i
fNii Π
′
i. (3)
Furthermore, taking the case D+CP as an example, Π
′
i can be
obtained according to the following method:
Π
′
D = (1.0− gCP )NCP (
rNCP
G
) + [1.0− (1.0− gCP )NCP ](rNCP
G
− α), gCP = ANCP
G
; (4)
Π
′
CP = (1.0− gCP )(
r(NCP + 1)
G
− 1.0) + gCP [r(NCP + 1)
G
− 1.0−
NCP∑
i=0
NCP !
i!(NCP − i)!g
i
CP (1.0− gCP )(NCP−i)
NDα
i+ 1
],
gCP =
A(NCP + 1)
G
. (5)
We can easily extend the above method to the other five evo-
lutionary situations.
APPENDIX B
Behaviors of the selection gradient dfCP /dt for different
parameter conditions are presented in Fig. 14. The illustra-
tions show that CP can transform the defined game into a co-
ordination game with full CP and full D (FD) as the two sta-
ble equilibria, along with an intermediate unstable steady state
(i.e., coexistence state of the two strategies). By the means of
the rule that larger gradient indicates higher speeds at which
the system converges to the stable equilibrator, we can state
that FD is more attractive than full CP, regardless that large
r (β and A) can help full CP to be more advantaged to some
extent.
Likewise, as shown in Fig. 15, DP can still transform the
defined game into a coordination game with full DP and FD
as the two stable equilibria except the first panel listed in
Fig. 15(b) and (c). We can also find that the system can more
quickly reach the state of FD than that of full DP. Figs. 14
and 15 provide a key hint that the position of the coexistence
state can be used to measure how facilitated different parame-
ters are for the punishment. More specifically, lower position
value of the intermediate coexistence state is, more likely the
system is to reach the sate of full punishment (FP).
Fig. 16 provides a comprehensive picture of the system dy-
namics for the case TC+D+DP, exhibiting rich phenomena.
Depending on the initial conditions, the system will evolve
towards one of the following three states: FD, stable coexis-
tence of DP and TC (i.e., state of segment punishers, SP), and
full DP; except the state of full cooperation (FC) or coexis-
tence of the three strategies. It is obvious that the three strate-
gies fail to form a cyclic dominance [73]. Note that attraction
basin of nondefectoin (ND) gets larger with increasing r, α or
A, which further confirms that the monotonous effects of the
three parameters in promoting public goods is despite of the
intervention of traditional cooperation. Specifically, achiev-
ing SP state largely depends on whether there are adequate
initial defector-driven punishers or not, especially for large r,
α or A. Another obvious feature is that defectors only have
opportunity to completely conquer entire population after that
defector-driven punishers have gone extinction (i.e., punish-
ment is absent) resulting from exploitation of traditional coop-
erators, exhibiting that the evolution trajectories which ended
in FD state have to firstly reach the side of simplex with two
corners ’D’ and ’TC’.
As shown in Fig. 17, three strategies TC, D and CP together
generate the similar results especially with respect to both the
patterns of attraction basins and evolution trajectories. The
only difference is that CP performs better in facilitating more
favorable initial conditions under which the system evolves
towards SP state. Thus, combing with the results given by
Fig. 16, CP shows a slightly greater advantage than DP in
sanctioning t[!h]hose defectors. Whatever, Figs. 16 and 17
show that the basins of attraction for SP is less than half of
the simplex, which reveals that one of the two punishers alone
fails to sustain cooperation alone unless the punishers initially
capture the majority of the population. Since both the punish-
ments are challenged by second-order free-riding from tradi-
tional cooperators.
Fig. 18 provides a different picture in which cooperator-
driven and defector-driven punishers together can effectively
repel defectors in most cases. More surprisingly, this phe-
nomenon is robust to the changes of punishment fine, synergy
factor and feedback sensitivity, as well as that increasing the
three parameters can enhance competitive advantage of the
two punishers to some extent. This suggests a non-trivial in-
terplay between defector-driven and cooperato-driven punish-
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FIG. 14. Gradient of selection in dependence on the fraction of cooperator-driven punishers for evolutionary situation D+CP. Stable steady
states fCP = 0 and fCP = 1 are depicted with solid circles, while the unstable steady state is depicted with an open circle. Arrows indicate
the expected direction of evolution. The arrow pointing to the right indicates that cooperator-driven punishment is favored over defection.
Panel (a) shows results for three different values of r with A = 0.25 and α = 4.0; (b) shows results for three different values of α with
A = 0.25 and r = 3.0; (c) shows results for three different values of A with α = 4.0 and r = 3.0. In any case, the intermediate state is
unstable on condition that left side of the gradient is negative while the right is positive.
ment in promoting the public cooperation (including TC, CP
and DP). Still, a stable interior point is still absent in such
case. Based on the illustrations in Fig. 18, we can say mix of
the two types of punishments is better in preventing the entire
population from being eroded by the first-order free riders.
Also, in a similar way, the growth of DP clusters start with
individuals at the tips of peninsulas and nearby isolated ones,
as shown in Figs. 19. In the same way, small or large sen-
sitivity induces uncompetitive uncompetitive defector-driven
punishers. Intermediate sensitivity is optimal for the punish-
ers.
Figs. 20 and 21 further support that there exist an opti-
mal intermediate range of feedback sensitivity to facilitate the
complete dominance of defector-driven punishers in presence
of traditional cooperators, which is also considered as a desir-
able evolutionary outcome with both first-order and second-
order free-riding. As shown in Fig. 20, traditional cooperators
at the borders of clusters still play a role of ’protective film’
which spatially isolate the punishers bearing the punishment
cost from those defectors. Meanwhile this leaves these tradi-
tional cooperators a chance to beat their defective neighbors
whose payoffs have been greatly reduced by DP. Compared
with the case TC+D+CP, spatial pattern formations shown in
Figs. 20 indicate similar trajectory of evolution. However,
except in the case of large intermediate feedback sensitivity
punishers are too active to lost the territorial battle with de-
fectors, further leading to extinction of all nondefectors. In
the same way, there is a strong strong mutualism between
defector-driven punishers and traditional cooperators.
The results for the evolutionary situation D+CP+DP are
presented in Fig. 22, enabling a direct comparison between
the two types of punishers. The illustrations are consistent
with the results in Fig. 6(e1)(e2) that cooperator-driven pun-
ishers are prior to defector-driven punishers. The illustra-
tions defector-driven ones. Especially positive peaks of both
∆CP−D(t) and ∆nCP−D(t) are found to be larger than those
of both ∆DP−D(t) and ∆nDP−D(t) for the same parame-
ter setting, while ∆nDP−CP (t) are always approximated to
zero. The phenomena reveal cooperator-driven punishers’
prevalence depends mainly on that they are more success-
ful in the battle against defectors. ∆CP−D(t) (∆nCP−D(t))
is thus larger than ∆DP−D(t) (∆nDP−D(t)) (see the third
and forth rows of panels in Fig.22). However, in the areas
without defectors their competition still frequently happens
in the form of majority-like rule, leading to fluctuations of
∆nDP−CP (t) exhibited in Fig. 22 and further exacerbating
the divide between the two types of punishers. At the same
time, cooperator-driven punishers seem more essential for sur-
vival of defector-driven punishers. Since DPs cannot persist
alone, and they have to combine with CPs who can fully take
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FIG. 15. Gradient of selection in dependence on the fraction of defector-driven punishers for evolutionary situation D+DP. In most cases,
fDP = 0 and fDP = 1 are stable steady states, while the coexistence state of the two strategies are unstable or even impossible. Likewise,
arrows indicate the expected direction of evolution, and DP is favored over D if the arrow points to the right. Panel (a) shows results for three
different values of r with A = 0.25 and α = 4.0; (b) shows results for three different values of α with A = 0.25 and α = 3.0; (c) shows
results for three different values of A with α = 4.0 and r = 3.0.
advantage of network reciprocity.
Using the same initial conditions for Fig. 4, in Fig. 23
we present the comprehensive picture in the parameter plane
of (A, α) of the evolutionary dynamics, as well as semi-
analytically estimated boundary lines. Larger regions of ND
phases suggest that network reciprocity induced by network
structure largely benefits cooperation by allowing nondefec-
tors to organize themselves into compact clusters.
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FIG. 16. The phase portraits of the system for the evolutionary
situation: TC+D+DP. (a) The portraits for three representative val-
ues of synergy factor are illustrated, where the other parameters are
A = 0.25 and α = 4.5. (b) The portraits for three representative
values of punishment fine are illustrated, where the other parameters
are A = 0.25 and r = 4.5. (b) The portraits for three representative
values of sensitivity are illustrated, where the other parameters are
α = 4.5 and r = 4.5. The solid triangle vertexes indicate attractors
of the system, while the hollow one means a repellor. The red re-
gions indicate attraction basins where the system converges to a state
of either full DP or SP.
FIG. 17. The phase portraits of the system for the evolutionary
situation: TC+D+CP. (a) The portraits for three representative val-
ues of synergy factor are illustrated, where the other parameters are
A = 0.25 and α = 4.5. (b) The portraits for three representative
values of punishment fine are illustrated, where the other parameters
are A = 0.25 and r = 4.5. (b) The portraits for three representative
values of sensitivity are illustrated, where the other parameters are
α = 4.5 and r = 4.5. The solid triangle vertexes indicate attractors
of the system, while the hollow one means a repellor. The red re-
gions indicate attraction basins where the system converges to a state
of either full CP or SP.
FIG. 18. The phase portraits of the system for the evolutionary sit-
uation: TC+CP+DP. (a) The portraits for three representative val-
ues of synergy factor are illustrated, where the other parameters are
A = 0.25 and α = 4.5. (b) The portraits for three representative
values of punishment fine are illustrated, where the other parameters
are A = 0.25 and r = 4.5. (b) The portraits for three representative
values of sensitivity are illustrated, where the other parameters are
α = 4.5 and r = 4.5. Three solid triangle vertexes suggest that each
of the three strategies is a attractor of the system. The red regions
indicate attraction basins where the system converges to a state of FP
(full CP or full DP) or SP.
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FIG. 19. Further illustrations of the evolutionary dynamics of the networked populations in case D+DP for three representative values of A.
Shown are the behaviors of the five different statistical characterizing quantities. Other parameters are r = 4.0 and α = 4.0.
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FIG. 20. In networked populations, spatial evolution of the three competing strategies TC, D and DP, for four representative values of A.
Depicted are snapshots of the Hexagonal lattice with size L = 200, where the punishment fine is α = 4.4. The color codes are the same as in
Fig. 10.
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values of A corresponding to the four groups of spatial snapshots presented in Fig. 20. The other parameters are r = 4.0 and α = 4.4.
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FIG. 22. Understanding of roles of different strategies in evolutionary process happening in networked populations, where three strategies D,
CP and DP are considered. Shown are the behaviors of three classes of statistical characterizing quantities for four representative values of A.
The other parameters are r = 4.0 and α = 4.0.
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FIG. 23. The dependence of simulated final steady fractions of three nondefection strategies on both A and α, where the results obtained from
networked populations are respectively illustrated for five different evolution situations: (a) D+CP, (b) D+DP, (c1) and (c2) TC+D+CP, (d1)
and (d2) TC+D+DP, (e1) and (e2) D+CP+DP. In all cases, the value of synergy factor is r = 4.0. Correspondingly, the value of fs used to
semi-analytically estimate the boundary lines are (see Appendix C for further details): (a) fCP = 1.0, (b) fDP = 0.96, (c1) fC = 0.1 and
fCP = 0.55, (c2) fC = 0.1 and fCP = 0.71 (d1) fTC = 0.115 and fDP = 0.465, (e1) fCP = 0.1 and fDP = 0.84, (e2) fCP = 0.3 and
fDP = 0.45.
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APPENDIX C
This appendix section presents how to semi-analytically ob-
tain the boundaries separating SP and FD phase at which the
following relationship
Πx = ΠD (6)
is satisfied. While Πx can be obtained according to the fol-
lowing method:
ΠX =
∑
i
wsΠs. (7)
ws represents the contribution weight of population with strat-
egy s ∈ {TC, D, CP, DP} in resisting defection. Fur-
thermore, we can estimate the values of fs and ws based
on either the initial values of fs for numerical integration of
the equations given in Appendix A for analytical treatments,
or the proportions of different strategy populations near the
boundaries between the two phases for simulations; so as to
semi-analytically identify the boundary lines for correspond-
ing evolution situations. In more detail, combing Eqs. (6) (7)
with the theoretical expressions of payoffs for different strate-
gies in Appendix IV, we further accordingly give the expres-
sions of α at boundary lines as function ofA for the following
six evolution situations: (1) D+CP:
α =
r
G − 1
Eψ + E(1.0− g′CP )i − 1
; (8)
E =
G−1∑
i=0
(G− 1)!
i!(G− 1− i)!f
i
CP (1.0− fCP )G−1−i, ψ =
i∑
j=0
i!
j!(i− j)!g
j+1
CP (1.0− gCP )i−j
G− 1− i
j + 1
;
g
′
CP =
Ai
G
gCP =
A(i+ 1)
G
.
It should be noted that E and ψ are just two operators to make
the equation look short, rather than functions or something
else. Moreover, fs indicates the proportion of population of
strategy s at the boundary lines. (2) D+DP:
α =
r
G − 1
Eψ + E(1.0− g′DP )i − 1
; (9)
E =
G−1∑
i=0
(G− 1)!
i!(G− 1− i)!f
i
DP (1.0− fDP )G−1−i, ψ =
i∑
j=0
i!
j!(i− j)!g
j+1
DP (1.0− gDP )i−j
G− 1− i
j + 1
;
g
′
DP =
A(G− i)
G
gDP =
A(G− i− 1)
G
.
(3) TC+D+CP:
α =
r
G − 1
wCPEψ + E(1.0− g′CP )i − 1
, wCP =
fCP
fTC + fCP
; (10)
E =
G−1∑
i,j=0
(G− 1)!
i!j!(G− 1− i− j!)!f
i
CP f
j
TC(1.0− fCP − fTC)G−1−i−j , ψ =
i∑
k=0
i!
k!(i− k)!g
k+1
CP (1.0− gCP )i−k
G− 1− i− j
k + 1
;
g
′
CP =
A(i+ j)
G
gCP =
A(i+ j + 1)
G
.
(4) TC+D+DP:
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α =
r
G − 1
wDPEψ + E(1.0− g′DP )i − 1
, wDP =
fDP
fTC + fDP
; (11)
E =
G−1∑
i,j=0
(G− 1)!
i!j!(G− 1− i− j!)!f
i
DP f
j
TC(1.0− fDP − fTC)G−1−i−j , ψ =
i∑
k=0
i!
k!(i− k)!g
k+1
DP (1.0− gDP )i−k
G− 1− i− j
k + 1
;
g
′
DP =
A(G− i− j)
G
gDP =
A(G− i− j − 1)
G
.
(5) D+CP+DP:
α =
r
G − 1
wDPEψDP + wCPEψCP + E(1.0− g′CP )i(1.0− g′DP )j − 1
; (12)
wDP =
fDP
fCP + fDP
, wCP =
fCP
fCP + fDP
;
E =
G−1∑
i,j=0
(G− 1)!
i!j!(G− 1− i− j!)!f
i
CP f
j
DP (1.0− fCP − fDP )G−1−i−j ;
ψDP =
i∑
k=0
i!
k!(i− k)!g
k
CP (1.0− gCP )i−k
j∑
l=0
j!
l!(j − l)!g
l+1
DP (1.0− gDP )j−l
G− 1− i− j
k + l + 1
;
ψCP =
i∑
k=0
i!
k!(i− k)!g
k+1
CP (1.0− gCP )i−k
j∑
l=0
j!
l!(j − l)!g
l
DP (1.0− gDP )j−l
G− 1− i− j
k + l + 1
;
g
′
DP =
A(G− i− j)
G
, g
′
CP =
A(i+ j)
G
, gDP =
A(G− i− j − 1)
G
, gCP =
A(i+ j + 1)
G
.
(6) TC+D+CP+DP:
α =
r
G − 1
wCPEψCP + wDPEψDP + E(1.0− g′CP )j(1.0− g′DP )k − 1
; (13)
wDP =
fDP
fTC + fCP + fDP
, wCP =
fCP
fTC + fCP + fDP
;
E =
G−1∑
i,j=0
(G− 1)!
i!j!k!(G− 1− i− j − k)!f
i
TCf
j
CP f
k
DP (1.0− fTC − fCP − fDP )G−1−i−j−k;
ψCP =
j∑
l=0
j!
l!(j − l)!g
l+1
CP (1.0− gCP )j−l
k∑
m=0
k!
m!(k −m)!g
m
DP (1.0− gDP )k−m
G− 1− i− j − k
l +m+ 1
;
ψDP =
j∑
l=0
j!
l!(j − l)!g
l
CP (1.0− gCP )j−l
k∑
m=0
k!
m!(k −m)!g
m+1
DP (1.0− gDP )k−m
G− 1− i− j − k
l +m+ 1
;
g
′
DP =
A(G− i− j − k)
G
, g
′
CP =
A(i+ j + k)
G
, gDP =
A(G− i− j − k − 1)
G
, gCP =
A(i+ j + k + 1)
G
.
However, Figs. 4, 5(d)-(e), 12 and 13 show that it is very
hard to get an accurate values of proportions different strate-
gies i. e., the values of ws, because of high fluctuations near
the boundaries between SP and FD phase, especially for sim-
ulation cases. Therefore, above equations actually provide
a semi-analytical method to identify the boundary lines, be-
28
cause one have to estimate the values of fs so as to obtain a line which is close to the numerical boundaries as much as
possible.
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